

Korea University, 27 March 2019

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MOST RECENT WORK

Simultaneous observation of particle and wave behaviors of entangled photons

SCIENTIFIC **Reports**

Sci. Rep. 7, 42539 (2017)

Zhong-Xiao Man¹, Yun-Jie Xia¹ & Nguyen Ba An²

ARTICLE

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-01058-6

OPEN

Entanglement of photons in their dual waveparticle nature

Adil S. Rab¹, Emanuele Polino¹, Zhong-Xiao Man², Nguyen Ba An ³, Rosario Lo Franco ^{4,5} & Fabio Sciarrino¹

Yun-Jie Xia², Nicolò Spagnolo¹,



Nature Communications 8, 915 (2017)

Deterministic joint remote preparation of an equatorial hybrid state via high-dimensional Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen pairs: active versus passive

> Quantum Inf Process (2018) 17:75 C.T. Bich, L.T. Dat, N.V. Hop, N.B. An

Nonstandard protocols for joint remote preparation of a general quantum state and hybrid entanglement of any dimension

PHYSICAL REVIEW A 98, 042329 (2018) N.B. An, L.T. Dat & J. Kim Designs of interactions between discrete- and continuous-variable states for generation of hybrid entanglement

> Quantum Inf. Process. 18:685 (2019) S. A. Podoshvedov, N.B. An

TODAY'S TALK On "QUANTUM DIALOGUE"

which belongs to CRYPTOGRAPHY



Alice



Bob



Alice want to send a meassge to Bob
Eve's in the line to eavesdrop
How to secure the communication?


PRIVATE-KEY SYSTEM (Vernam 1917)

ENGRYPT

 $\begin{array}{c} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array}$

DECRYPT

 ⊕ 11010110 Ciphertext
 11100011 Secret Key
 = 00110101 Plaintext



Absolute Secure BUT: "One-time use" -> INCONVENIENT

PUBLIC-KEY SYSTEM (Rivest-Shamir-Adlman [RSA] 1997)

Alice: PA, SA

Bob: PB, SB

PX[SX[m]] = SX[PX[m]] = m

If Alice wants to send M = m + s to Bob Alice encodes: PB[m] + SA[s] and sends to Bob Bob decodes: SB[PB[m]] + PA[SA[s]] = m + s

Good: CONVENIENT (Now in use)

BAD: Unproven Security & Broken by Quantum Computer

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

Uses: - QUANTUM RESOURCES - QUANTUM LAWS (Nocloning, Measure → Disturbance,...)

> QKD (BB84, E91,B92, ...): UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY (even in presence of qu-computers)

BUT:

Question: Can ones communicate Without a prior QKD (as in emergency situations)?

Answer: YES, by QUANTUM DIALOGUE!

QUANTUM DIALOGUE: Way to securely exchange info (like to securely talk with each other) without a prior QKD

> HOW TO PERFORM QUANTUM DIALOGUE?

Alice prepares

 $|\Psi\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_A |0\rangle_B + |1\rangle_A |1\rangle_B$

Sends B to Bob. Bob applies I, X, Z or Y on B if wants

to send 2 bits 00, 01, 10 or 11, then returns B to Alice

$$I \otimes I |\Psi\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_{A}|0\rangle_{B} + |1\rangle_{A}|1\rangle_{B}$$
$$I \otimes X |\Psi\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_{A}|1\rangle_{B} + |1\rangle_{A}|0\rangle_{B}$$
$$I \otimes Z |\Psi\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_{A}|1\rangle_{B} - |1\rangle_{A}|0\rangle_{B}$$
$$I \otimes Y |\Psi\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_{A}|0\rangle_{B} - |1\rangle_{A}|0\rangle_{B}$$

Alice makes Bell measurement to learn Bob's 2 bits.

Twice Holevo's bound (1973) \implies SUPERDENSE CODING (1992)

Now: Bob wants to send Alice
$$i, j$$
 and Alice wants to send Bob m, n
Alice prepares
 $|\Psi_{m,n}\rangle_{AB} : \begin{cases} |\Psi_{0,0}\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_A |0\rangle_B + |1\rangle_A |1\rangle_B \\ |\Psi_{0,1}\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_A |1\rangle_B + |1\rangle_A |0\rangle_B \\ |\Psi_{1,0}\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_A |0\rangle_B - |1\rangle_A |1\rangle_B \\ |\Psi_{1,1}\rangle_{AB} = |0\rangle_A |0\rangle_B - |1\rangle_A |1\rangle_B \end{cases}$


 $C_{00} = I, C_{01} = X, C_{10} = Z, C_{11} = Y$
 $I \otimes C_{ij} |\Psi_{m,n}\rangle_{AB} = |\Psi_{m\oplus i,n\oplus j}\rangle_{AB}$

Alice sends B to Bob, Bob applies C_{ij} on B and returns to Alice

- Alice's Bell measurement $\rightarrow |\Psi_{m\oplus i,n\oplus j}\rangle_{AB}$ to learn i, j

- Alice announce $m \oplus i, n \oplus j \Longrightarrow$ Bob learns m, n

QUANTUM DIALOGUE [NBA, PLA 328,6 (2004)]



Security to be discussed later!

Another possible way to perform QUANTUM DIALOGUE

Exploiting NONSELECTIVE MEASUREMENT (= Measurement without reading the outcome)

Classically,
 Measurement without reading outcome = Doing Nothing

Quantumly,
 Measurement without reading outcome = Making Sense

QUANTUM DIALOGUE

MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES

- For N = odd prime
- ∃ complete set of N + 1 MUBs (basis $\beta = 0, 1, ..., N 1$ and basis "N + 1") Each basis has N orthonormal states
- A kth state (k = 0, 1, ..., N 1) of a β th basis

$$\left|\beta;k\right\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{l=0}^{N-1} \Omega^{\beta l^2 + kl} \left|l\right\rangle$$

$$\left| \left< \beta'; k' \left| \beta; k \right> \right|^2 \!=\! \frac{1}{N} ; \forall k, k'; \beta \neq \beta'$$

QD by Nonselective measurement

- Alice: $\beta \in \{0, 1, ..., N-1\}$ - Bob: $\beta' \in \{0, 1, ..., N-1\}$
- They wish to exchange their numbers securely



QD by Nonselective measurement

- Alice prepares (with β to be exchanged and k, q fixed)

$$\left|\beta;k,q\right\rangle_{AB} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{l=0}^{N-1} \Omega^{\beta l^2 + kl} \left|l\right\rangle_1 \left|q+l\right\rangle_2$$

Then Alice sends quNit B to Bob

- Bob measures B in basis β' (the to-be-exchanged number) Then returns B to Alice without reading outcome (nonselective meas.) \Rightarrow QuNits A and B become in a mixed (NOT pure) state

$$\rho_{AB}(\beta,\beta',k,q) = \sum_{p=0}^{N-1} \Pi_A(\beta',p) |\beta;k,q\rangle_{AB} \langle\beta;k,q| \Pi_A(\beta',p),$$

$$\Pi_A(\beta',p) = |\beta';p\rangle_A \langle\beta';p|$$

QD by Nonselective measurement

- Alice, having both A and B, measures them in β -basis (in which he prepared $|\beta; k, q\rangle_{AB}$) to find $|\beta; k', q'\rangle_{AB}$ with probability

$$P_{AB}(\beta, \beta', k, q, k', q') = \frac{1}{N} \delta_{k-k', 2(\beta - \beta')(q-q')}$$



$$\implies \beta' = \beta + \frac{k' - k}{2(q - q')}$$

That is, Alice gets Bob's number β' Then Alice announce $\beta + \beta' \Longrightarrow$ Bob gets Alice's β . THE INFO EXCHANGE IS DONE! CAN BE REPEATED TO DO QUANTUM DIALOGUE

EVE's ATTACKS


CAPTURE-AND-REPLACE ATTACK

- Eve creates her own $|\beta''; k'', q''\rangle_{CD}$ (β'', k'', q'') at her choice) and CAPTURES *B*, store it on the way Alice \rightarrow Bob Then REPLACES *B* by *C* to be sent to Bob.
- Bob nonselectively measure C in basis β' , then send it to Alice
- On the way Bob → Alice, Eve CAPTURES C, measures CD in basis β'' to get β' Then, nonselectively measures B (from memory) in basis β' and sends it toAlice.
 Alice measures AB to get β' too, then announce β + β' to allows Bob know β

THUS, Eve perfectly eavesdrops (If no SECURITY CHECK)

SECURITY CHECK

- To detect Eve in this and other kinds of attacks, two CONTROL MODES (CM) are introduced:
- CM1 (On the way Alice \rightarrow Bob)
- Bob measures B in computational basis and publishes outcome Alice also measures A in computational basis.
- Then they compare their outcomes to detect Eve
- CMQ (Q) = D D A! > Q
- CM2 (On the way Bob \rightarrow Alice).
- Alice and Bob reveal their choices and check some equality to detect Eve



CONCLUSION

Exploiting Quantum Physics [Quantum resources, quantum unitary operations, quantum measurements (even nonselective measurements), ...] allows secure exchange of info without a prior QKD, like in a (quantum) dialogue

The words "QUANTUM DIALOGUE" first appeared in [NBA, PLA 328, 6 (2004)] See also [NBA, J. Kor. Phys. Soc. 47, 562 (2005) and Adv. Nat. Sci.: Nanosci. Nanotech. 9, 025001 (2018)]

There have been many publications that extend QD in various directions taking into accounts real factors (20)

Thank you감사 합니다 !and hope to see you again !또 보자

